The mentor-mentee bond between Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim and Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi has, in all likelihood, reached its end.

From Zahid’s hard-hitting address at the Umno General Assembly to their subtle back-and-forth exchanges on social media, this political relationship—which once managed to keep up appearances for the sake of the Unity Government—can no longer hide its deep rifts.

Zahid came clearly prepared this time, aiming to answer to the Umno grassroots while sending a strong political signal to Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim.

Judging by current public momentum, Zahid appears to hold the upper hand. Yet, one should never underestimate Anwar.

Anwar positioned himself as the “teacher,” subtly telling his former “student” to learn about “Madani diplomacy.” It seemed offhanded, but in reality, it was a composure-retaining political manoeuvre that avoided taking the bait.

For Anwar, the point is not scoring verbal points against Zahid, but keeping control of the narrative within the Unity Government.

Thus, even if their relationship exists in name only, Anwar sees no immediate need to expel Umno from the administration; likewise, Umno will not easily walk away on its own.

The reasons are pragmatic. Umno has repeatedly stated it will honour the Unity Government agreement and remain in power until the end of its term. As long as Umno does not formally withdraw its support, Anwar has no reason to tear down this political framework.

On the other hand, if Umno exits on its own, it faces the risk of losing executive resources and needing to find new allies, while bearing the political stigma of trying to topple the Unity Government.

In short, the relationship is broken, yet both sides must continue to cooperate—creating the ultimate paradox of the Unity Government.

However, the fact that Zahid is laying the groundwork for a “post-Anwar era” does not mean Umno has secured a smooth fallback plan.

If Umno ultimately parts ways with Pakatan Harapan (PH), the next question arises: Where does UMNO go from there?

The obvious answer seems to be Perikatan Nasional (PN), but taking that path will not be straightforward.

While there is common ground for cooperation between Umno and PAS, working together is vastly different from entering a formal alliance. Once political interests become tangible, their biggest conflict will not be over ideology, but over who leads and who compromises.

First is the choice of Prime Minister. PAS has made it clear that the next prime ministerial candidate must come from its own ranks, signaling that it seeks not just cooperation, but greater political dominance.

The question is: Would Umno be willing to be No 2 for long term?

Although Umno is no longer as dominant as it once was, it longs to lead the federal government. Zahid repeatedly emphasised Umno’s “leadership” DNA during his policy speech.

Getting the party to accept a PAS-led prime minister choice will inevitably trigger pushback from within its ranks.

Even trickier is seat allocation. In states like Perak and Pahang, both Umno and PAS hold considerable political strength. Should they cooperate, deciding who defends traditional strongholds and who concedes seats will trigger a brutal negotiation process.

Even in PN-governed states like Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis—where Umno holds almost no state seats—would PAS yield a large number of seats to Umno just for the sake of partnership?

Similarly, Umno will not easily compromise on seats in its own traditional bastions.

Therefore, if Umno and PAS intend to form a genuine alliance before the 16th General Election (GE16), the difficult discussion isn’t about whether to cooperate, but who concedes how much, who retains what, and who takes the lead.

They can join forces against PH today, only to become direct competitors tomorrow over seat distribution.

This is Zahid’s primary dilemma: While seeking political manoeuvrability for Umno in the “post-Anwar era,” he must simultaneously resolve power dynamics and conflicting interests with PAS.

Anwar, by contrast, still has time—though time may not stay on his side forever.

If GE16 is not called early, Anwar can leverage the remainder of his term to push forward reforms, improve governance, and rebuild support through concrete achievements. But as time wears on, he will face not just Umno, but internal challenges within PH itself.

The internal consolidation of Parti Keadilan Rakyat, changing Chinese voter support for DAP, and Parti Amanah Negara’s lack of political momentum are real issues Anwar must confront.

If the three PH components fail to rally their base, even if Anwar successfully maintains the Unity Government, he may not be able to replicate the political formula of the last election.

Consequently, Anwar’s true crisis isn’t how harshly Zahid spoke at the Umno General Assembly, but what compelling case he can present to voters when the general election arrives.

Whether reforms materialise, whether the economy and public livelihoods improve, and whether citizens feel the impact of governance are the core questions Anwar must answer.

Likewise, Umno shouldn’t oversimplify the “post-Anwar era.”

Partnering with PH requires accepting the political terms set by Anwar and PH; pivoting toward PN means facing PAS’s increasingly assertive demands.

Therefore, who will have the last laugh remains far from settled.

The true indicator will likely be the Melaka state election.

Expected to take place within this year, although Umno and PH have negotiated potential cooperation, barring any last-minute surprises, Barisan Nasional (BN) is likely to clash directly with PH once again, following the Johor and Negeri Sembilan state elections.

This state election will serve as a crucial barometer of whether the relationship between Umno and PH has truly broken down.

Yet even so, whether Umno and PAS can go the distance remains a major question mark.

Two tigers cannot share a single mountain. PAS seeks political dominance, while Umno seeks political survival; PAS insists on supplying the prime minister, while Umno is reluctant to settle as second in command. Coupled with the pragmatic reality of seat allocations, a partnership cannot be forged simply on the slogan of “Malay-Muslim unity.”

Therefore, the end of Anwar and Zahid’s mentor-mentee relationship does not signal an immediate divorce between Umno and PH. Nor does the potential for cooperation between Umno and PAS mean both parties will smoothly join hands.

Zahid may have won this round, but what shapes the political landscape of GE16 won’t be who delivers the fiercest rhetoric at a party assembly, but who converts political momentum into actual votes.

What Anwar cannot afford to lose is not a verbal spat with Zahid, but reform progress and public trust.

What Umno truly needs to answer is not just how to defeat Anwar, but after doing so—whom to walk with, how to divide the seats, and who will lead the next government.

The Melaka state election may be the first test, but GE16 will be the ultimate showdown.

(Choo Joon Kian is Deputy Executive Editor-in-Chief of Sin Chew Daily.)