Taiwan’s admiration for Japan has always existed beneath the surface, but in recent years it has surged to unprecedented highs.

A nationwide survey conducted in late 2024 found that 76 per cent of Taiwanese now describe Japan as their “favourite country.” Another poll recorded that 70 per cent believe Taiwan should align most closely with Japan, ahead of the United States and far ahead of China.

Even earlier surveys from 2022 showed pro-Japan sentiment nearing 75 per cent, confirming a long-term shift rather than a temporary spike.

For most observers, this is framed as a matter of identity and democratic affinity.

But for Beijing, these numbers are not mere feelings—they are strategic data.

When three quarters of the Taiwanese population identify more with Japan than with China, Beijing concludes that unification is becoming increasingly implausible.

Even worse, from China’s perspective, Taiwan appears to be embedding itself in the Tokyo–Washington security orbit.

That perception triggers consequences that stretch far beyond the Taiwan Strait and indirectly alter the balance of power across Indo-China.

Japan and Taiwan anchor the northern segment of the First Island Chain, long viewed in Beijing as a U.S.-aligned barrier designed to contain China’s rise.

When Taiwanese public opinion becomes overwhelmingly pro-Japan, China sees the chain tightening—not just militarily but psychologically.

A population that identifies this strongly with Japan cannot, in Beijing’s view, be politically reclaimed without enormous risk.

The symbolic meaning is profound: Taiwan is drifting away, and Japan is becoming its guardian.

When China feels pressure in the north, its response is to reinforce the south.

 Indo-China—Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia—becomes Beijing’s geopolitical cushion.

These countries offer land corridors to the Indian Ocean, strategic proximity to key sea lanes, and political systems that are more aligned, or at least more manageable, from China’s perspective.

 As Taiwan and Japan move closer, China deepens its influence in Indo-China to ensure that no strategic vacuum emerges on its southern flank.

Yet Indo-China presents a paradox. The region is also the epicentre of sprawling cyber-scam syndicates responsible for billions of dollars in global losses.

Chinese nationals are often victims—sometimes trafficked into scam compounds, other times targeted by online fraud rings operating in Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia.

For Beijing, this criminal ecosystem is a domestic political embarrassment and an international burden.

 Thus, China’s increasing penetration of Indo-China becomes intertwined with its campaign to pressure local militaries and police forces to dismantle these illicit networks.

What emerges is a deeper and more forceful Chinese footprint in Indo-China—driven partly by crime control but ultimately by geopolitics. China’s engagement becomes more intrusive, more complex, and more strategic. Indo-China’s governments, dependent on Chinese investment and diplomatic backing, frequently acquiesce. As China consolidates influence in these states, the balance of power in the sub-region tilts further toward Beijing.

This shift is not the result of Indo-China’s decisions. It is the result of Taiwan’s. As Taiwanese identity moves closer to Japan, China binds Indo-China more tightly to its own orbit.

The logic is straightforward: if the Japan–Taiwan partnership hardens the northern barrier, then Beijing must secure the southern frontier. The outcome is a region increasingly drawn into China’s strategic gravitational pull—through infrastructure investments, security cooperation, crackdowns on cybercrime, law enforcement influence, and political alignment.

The effects are already visible. Myanmar’s military regime is increasingly dependent on Beijing for diplomatic support.

 Laos remains financially tethered to China through debt and energy infrastructure. Cambodia continues to serve as China’s most reliable mainland partner, with growing military and intelligence ties. In each case, Beijing’s southern strategy grows stronger as Taiwan’s northern alignment becomes more pro-Japan.

Indo-China did not choose this role. It did not encourage Taiwan’s identity shift.

Yet it is Indo-China that now absorbs the strategic consequences.

Great-power rivalry rarely remains contained within the geography where it begins.

 It flows outward—seeking buffers, leverage, and strategic depth. Taiwan’s overwhelming admiration for Japan, reflected in polls consistently showing support above 70 per cent, is not just a sentiment.

 It is a signal. And Beijing hears that signal loudly.

In hearing it, Beijing shifts its weight south. And in shifting south, it reshapes Indo-China.

This is how Taiwanese public opinion—rooted in identity, history, and fear—indirectly recalibrates the balance of power across Indo-China, a region now caught between the emotional choices of an island and the strategic anxieties of a continent.

(Dr Phar Kim Beng is Professor of ASEAN Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia, and Cambridge Commonwealth Scholar.)